

January 25, 1963

TOP SECRET

The Vice President

ATTACHED
By [redacted], NARS, Date [redacted]

Colonel Burris

Cuba (NSC Meeting, January 25)

The attached documents have been prepared by the specially designated Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in State, Mr. Cottrell, in consultation principally with State, Defense and CIA officials. The documents contain recommendations and observations, and fall into the following general categories:

Tab A: Summary of U.S. Policy Objectives, Supporting Actions and Recommended Disposition of the Cuban Brigade.

Tab B: Broader Statement of U.S. Policy and Recommended Supporting Actions.

Tab C: U.S. Policies in the CAS and Recommended Courses of Action.

Tab D: Disposition of the Cuban Brigade.

Tab E: Problems to be Resolved Regarding Cuba.

The current list of U.S. policy objectives has been gleaned from Presidential statements, interpretation of agreements and U.N. action, and certain assumptions. Some fundamental policies, however, are not presented and must precede the implementation of certain objectives outlined in these papers. For example, the United States should come to some basic decision on its own interpretation of the no invasion pledge. Incident to this decision is the determination of whether the United States will permit, condone, assist or participate in an invasion or in related support activities of one. More consideration must be given to provocative activities, such as low level reconnaissance, increased intelligence activities, and training of the Cuban Brigade, which might create incidents in which the United States would be compelled to take retaliatory action and eventually engage in varying degrees of support suppression or even invasion. While such activities can be useful as pretexts, the basic decision must be made as to whether an invasion of Cuba, directly or indirectly, be supported, or whether, in a lesser sense, serious provocations or incidents should be a part of the basic policy. When this decision is made, the disposition of the Cuban Brigade can more easily be determined; the frequency and technique of aerial surveillance can be specified, and the policy for

U. S. retaliation in the event of an incident can be clearly set down.

The above problems are more basic and require early decisions because they involve the possibility of direct conflict or intervention with attendant worldwide political implications. It might be said that the decisions on these issues will establish the future of the U. S. course of action toward Cuba as active or passive.

The other recommendations of the Coordinating Committee relate principally to economic pressures and certain political actions, particularly through the CAS. At the least, all of these actions should be pursued to the maximum extent.